Virtue Ethics notes – Heidi Phelps' Classes

Virtue Ethics

Remember that when we are dealing with objectivist ethics we are dealing with the concept of humans as a class with human nature and therefore objectivist ethics has dealt with answering the question, given our common human nature, how ought we to act?
Virtue ethics is an ancient answer to that question.
Aristotle first proposed this system of ethics in his Nicomachean Ethics.
This is the argument as presented by Aristotle:[1]
1. “Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.
2. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth.
3. But where such arts fall under a single capacity- as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others- in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.
4. If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right?
5. If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object…
6. Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good…what is the highest of all goods achievable by action.
7. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy;
8. but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise.
9. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour; they differ, however, from one another- and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their comprehension.
10. To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment… Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts…
11. A consideration of the prominent types of life shows that people of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness with honour; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since it is thought to depend on those who bestow honour rather than on him who receives it, but the good we divine to be something proper to a man and not easily taken from him. Further, men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honoured, and among those who know them, and on the ground of their virtue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue is better.
12. The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather take the aforenamed objects to be ends; for they are loved for themselves. But it is evident that not even these are ends…
13. Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for self and never for the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself…
14. …the final good is thought to be self-sufficient…the self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others…Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.
15. Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function…What then can this be? Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal.
16. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle…Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say ‘so-and-so-and ‘a good so-and-so’ have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre, and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being added to the name of the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case, and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence:
17. if this is the case, human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete…’in a complete life.’ “
Aristotle concludes that happiness is what people ultimately act for the sake of. The Greek word for happiness is “eudemonia.” Eudemonia is not just feelings of pleasure or always getting what one wants. Instead, it is a general state of well-being. It is the life that is arranged in such a way that it allows a person to reach the highest levels of being or existence. This is not something that happens all at once, or even over a few years. This is something that is pursued over a lifetime.
If happiness is the highest aim of all people, then how ought one behave to obtain that happiness? Aristotle’s answer is that one ought to act in accordance with one’s natural inclinations, or virtuously.
Virtue ethics demands more than just occasional good deeds. Instead, virtue is a matter of character. [2]
So what is virtue?
1. When we describe virtue, we are talking about character. Character is not just someone’s personality. In the Aristotelian sense character is an internal predisposition to act in certain ways in certain situations. Virtue is not something you are born with either. As humans we have certain predispositions, but we must learn how to act on these predispositions. In this way, we learn how to be virtuous. Virtue becomes a habit through learning. Therefore, a good character is learned, and it is the same for everyone. And so, as we read, “Human good turns out to be the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete. But we must add “in a complete life.” For one swallow does not make a summer, not does one day; and so too, one day, or a short timed, does not make a man blessed and happy.”
2. Virtues are good character traits that result in good acts. Therefore, virtue ethics includes a belief in ethical truths. There is a real difference between what is good and what is not good. A person can have a bad character and therefore be a bad person. It is not a matter of preference or taste. It is a matter of what human nature is and which character best coincides with that nature.
3. Virtue is not simply an isolated trait, say courage, that a person may have. Instead, virtue is the package of traits that coincide with the natural inclinations of humans in accordance with human nature. In other words, a person cannot pick and choose which virtues he or she wants to have as part of his character and call himself virtuous. Instead, a virtuous person seeks and learns all of the virtues and recognizes them as his natural inclination.
4. In Aristotelian virtue ethics, virtues are not seen as opposites to vices. Instead, virtues are the mean between two extremes. These two extremes are vices, one of excess and one of deficiency.

Courage: Take an example of a man who is walking past an swift, icy river and sees a puppy drowning. The man jumps into the river and makes an attempt to save the puppy. However, in his attempt, the man is unsuccessful so that not only does the puppy drown, he also drowns. We would therefore ask whether this man acted courageously.
If our only two options were courage and cowardice, we would choose courage. However, Aristotle would point out that there is another way to do this. Instead, of putting courage and cowardice at opposite ends of the spectrum, Aristotle places cowardice and imprudent risk taking at opposite ends of the spectrum with courage as the mean between the two extremes.

1. Because each virtue is the mean between two extremes, Aristotle emphasizes finding the “golden mean.” This is what we ought to aim for.
2. Virtue, as something that is learned, is an important part of education. It expands to the responsibility of the parents and society to teach a child what virtuous living is. Then the child learns through trial and error and by the guidance of virtuous people, and he gains habits that guide him in various situations.
3. Furthermore, because a virtue is more than just good or bad but rather the mean between two extremes, one act can be good without being the best. Or an act can be bad without being the worst. There is therefore more wiggle room for trial and error. If we fail to do the best thing the first time, this does not mean that we are wicked or evil people. It just means that we have learned something valuable that we can learn next time we need to make a moral decision.
4. There are three things in Aristotelian ethics that make an action good.

We must understand what we are doing and why it is good.
The actions we do must be freely chosen.
The action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character. What this means is that doing one virtuous act does not make a person virtuous. Instead, a virtuous act is virtuous because it is done by a virtuous person. For example: If a habitual liar decides to tell the truth one time, this does not make him an honest man.

Because humans are by nature rational beings, wisdom is the foundation of all other virtues.
Benefits

Humans are multi-faceted individuals who encounter many different situations and circumstances. Virtue ethics allows the individual to balance personal aspects of a decision with objective standards.
Virtue ethics allows for degrees of goodness. An act is usually not simply right or wrong. The world is not that simple. Virtue ethics recognizes this.
Virtue ethics recognizes that a good act is not the same thing as a good person.
Virtue ethics focuses on what is good and it gives a person a sense of hope. The other forms of objectivist ethics are focused on what you cannot do.
Virtue ethics prescribes a model for behavior that is attainable. You don’t have to have super knowledge and bear the responsibility of what everyone wants, as utilitarianism requires, and you are given guidelines for correct behavior that leaves lots of room for learning, unlike natural law and Kantian ethics. All people can become virtuous over a life time.

Problems

Does virtue ethics help us know what to do? What happens when two people having an honest conversation disagree about what a virtuous person ought to do?
Can virtues be used badly? What about a white supremacist?
Doesn’t virtue ethics just collapse into ethical egoism?
What about when two virtues conflict?
How do we decide which virtues are virtues? All lists are virtually the same with a few variants. However, why those virtues and not others? Example: Humility

[1] Excerpts from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, sections 1-5, Translated by W.D. Ross.

[2] Wilkens, Steve, Beyond Bumper Sticker Ethics: An Introduction to Theories of Right and Wrong, InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove, Illinois, 1995, ch. 7.